Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity and Dr. Floyd F. Hatch v. Salt Lake City, Earl J. Glade, Fred Tedesco, John B. Matheson, L. C. Romney, Cleve Wooley and W. Y. Tipton : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity and Dr. Floyd F. Hatch v.
Salt Lake City, Earl J. Glade, Fred Tedesco, John B.
Matheson, L. C. Romney, Cleve Wooley and W. Y.
Tipton : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Christensen; City Attorney; Homer Holmgren; A. Pratt Kesler; Assistant City Attorneys;
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, No. 7357 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1141
i:' -~ .. ... 
... 
,, 
Case No. 7357 
. :·=================== 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~--- PHI KAPPA IOTA FRATERNITY, 
~- . a non-profit corporation, and DR. 
~:, .. : ~-: FLOYD F. HATCH, 
PlxJim,tijf s amd Appelloots, 
vs. 
~ ~ "1 
~~:. SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal cor-
r¥ , • ~~:-:: · poration, EARL J. GLADE, FRED 
:.~: ~_ - TED E S C 0, City Commissioners; 
t~ I CLEVE WOOLLEY and W. Y. TIP-l~<· TON, 
~~"':-"· _ Defe1'1Jdants ·0/Ytd Re8!PJondents . 
. · ... ~· :·· - ... 
~;· :-~; . .,~: 
~- _ :' . :' 
If 
r"...-~(' . RE!SPONDENTS' BRIEF 
~ 
~:~ ~-
~-·- ,_. ~ .--, n ~ 1ft.IA ~r f. ·- ~w~ll ~
~-~-
~~---~-~·~---------------------ll,.lliili MillER iltJHf, 8flH 
. t ... 
i ' I 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City !Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Assist(J,(Ybt City Alt.torneys, 
Attorneys fovr Defendants 
and Respoooents. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS.'"'"·································································· 1 
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................. 9 
POINT I. The Plaintiffs can only rely upon those feature'S 
of the ordinance which affect them in their property 
rights and- only to the extent that such rights are 
affected ····································································-···-·····---·· 9 
POINT II. Plaintiffs have given the ordinance an erroneous 
construction under sub-divisions A, B, C, D, E, and· 
F of their brief, and in addition are not entitled to 
urge the alleged di'Scriminatory features therein 
asserted -----------------------------------------------········ ...... ·---------- ____ . _ .... 16 
POINT III. Greek letter fraternity may be excluded from resi-
dential district under zoning law...................................... 22 
POINT IV. The wisdom and necessity for the zoning, the num-
ber and nature of the districts created, and the 
boundarie'S thereof and the uses permitted therein 
are matters which lie within the ·discretion of the 
governing body of the citY-----------------------·--------------------···· 26 
POINT V. The presumption is that the zoning ordinance is 
valid and the burden is on the one challenging the 
the ordinance to prove its invaliditY-------------------------------- 36 
POINT VI. Fixing a boundary for a use district at a certain 
number of feet from a given point does not make 
the ordinance invalid .... ---·---------------------------------··················· 51 
INDEX ·OF ~CASES, TEXTS AND STATUTES. 
CASES. 
Burkholder v. City of Sterling, 381 Ill. 564, 46· N.E. 2d 45.............. 41 
Gaires v. Building Commissioner of Hingham, 83 N.E. 2d 550 .. ~----- 45 
Cassel Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 14 N .W. 2d 600........................ 43 
City of Lincoln v. Logan-Jones, 120 N~eb. 827, 235 N.W. 583........ 25 
City of Tuscon v. Arizona Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 272 P. 923........ 42 
' Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. City of Portersville, 
203 P. 2d 823 ........ ---------------------------------------------··································· 48 
Cronin v. Adams, 192 U.S. 108, 28 L. Ed. 365..................................... 1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX-( Oontilnued) 
Page 
De Bartolo v. Village of Oak Park, 396 Ill. 404, 71 N.E. 2d 693.... 37 
Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 13 N.W .. 2d 634...................... 40 
Dupage County v. Henderson, 83 N.E. 2d 720.................................... 38 
Ex Parte Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 P. 1056, 61 A. L. R. 332.............. 12 
Heald v. District of Columbia, 6~6 L. Ed. 853, 259 U.S. 114................ 13 
H-eimerle v. Village of Bronxville, 5 N.Y.S. 2d 1002 ........................ 15, 54 
In re Jennings' gstate, 198 A. 621........................................................ 59 
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 286 N.W. 602.... 11 
Langella v. City of Bayonne, 46· A. 2d '789 (N.J.)............................ 51 
Lockhard v. City of Los Angeles, 202 P. 2d 38.................................. 49 
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 141 P. 2d 704.: .................................... 26, 27 
Miller v. Board of Public Works, Cal. 2.34 P. 381, 38 A.L.R. 1479.... 44 
Pas's v. T'own of Bloomfield, 49 A. 2d 4 76.............................................. 37 
Pettis v. Alpha Alpha Chapter of Phi Beta Pi, 115 Neb. 525, 
213 N. W. 835 ....................................................................................... 22 
Platt v. Philbrick, 47 P. 2d 302 ........................ -..................................... 12 
Premier-Pabst Sales Go. v. ·Grosscup, 80 L. Ed. 1155, 
298 U .'S. 226......................................................................................... 14 
Repp v. Shahadi, 132 N. J. L. 24, 38 A. 2d 284 ......... ·-······················· 36 
Retz v. Leghston, 10 Ca. App. 685, 103 P. 363.................................. 11 
Taintor v. H-attemer, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 537................................................ 34 
Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stewart, 82 •Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 231.................. 14 
Vine v. Board of Adjustment Village of Ridgewood, 56 A. 2d 1'22.... 52 
White v. ~uquire Funeral Home, 221 Ala. 440, 129 S. 84.................. 58 
Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 175 P. 2d 542............................ 29 
Wulfshon v. Bruden, 241 N.Y. 288,. 150 N.E:. 120, 43 A.L.R. 651...... ·15 
Zadwomy v. City of Chicago, 380 Ill. 4 70, 44 N.E. 2d 426................ 37 
TEXTS. 
16 C.J.S. page 179·, Section 88................................................................ 10 
11 Am. Jur. page 752, Section 111......................................................... 10 
S'fATUTES. 
Section 15-8-90 U~G.A. 1943 ....... ~............................................................ 26 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHI KAP·PA IOTA FRATERNITY, 
a non-profit corporation, and · DR. 
FLOYD F. HATCH, 
P~imtiff s a;nd Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municip·al cor-
poration, EARL J. GLADE, FRED 
TED· E S C 0, City Commissioners; 
CLEVE WOOLLEY and W. Y. TIP-
TON, 
Defendants arru1 Resrpondents. 
RE1S.PONDENTS' BRIEF 
~s:TATEMENT O·F FACTS 
Case No. 
7357 
In 1927 Salt Lake City adopted a comprehensive 
zoning ordinance after holding public hearings ('T. page 
84). As originally enacted the zonin·g ordinance di-
vided the City into the following use ·districts : Resi-
dential ''A,'' Residential '' A-2,'' Residential '' B'' and 
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'' B-2,'' Residential '' C, '' Commercial, Industrial, In-
dustrial '' B'' and Unrestricted. The uses permitted in 
Residential ''A'' District remained in all respects the 
same to the present time, except for the am·endmen't 
complained o.f by plaintiffs. On page 8 of plaintiff's 
brief, the pertinent parts of the present ordinance, as 
amended in January 1939, relating to R:esidential ''A'' 
District, are quoted. The amendment involved only 
sub-paragraph 6 of paragraph (h), suh-pa·ragraph (b) 
containing 7 sub-paragra~phs each enumerating an ex-
ception to the restrictions imposed in paragraph (a). 
Prior to the amendment this sub-paragraph read: "6. 
Dormitories, fraternity or sorority houses or board-
ing houses occupied only by the faculty or s1tudents of 
a public educational institution and supervised by the 
authorities thereof.'' 
The 193'9 amendment retained the above language 
and ·simply added thereto the following: ''subject, how-
ever, to ~the express condition that such dormitories or 
fraternity or sorority houses shall not be located or es-
tablished more than 600 feet distant from the land and 
p·remises occupied by the institution to which they are 
incident.' ' 
As so amended this ordinance has stood unchal-
lenged and unchanged since its adoption in January 
19-39 until this ·present action was commenced by plain-
tiffs in November 1948, nearly 10 years later. 
It will he noticed that the ordinanye before amended 
referred only to public educational instiitutions, and did 
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3 
not permit fraternities in Residential'' A'' District where 
the educational institution 'vas private or one not a 
public institution. The amendment did not change that 
aspect, it simply continu-ed it. The a1nendment, there-
fore, is no n1ore directed toward the University of Utah 
than 'Yas the original ordinance, nor is it any more di.s-
criminator~7" against private schools or schools n6t fall-
ing within the characterization of a public educational 
institution than was the original ordinance. All that was 
accomplished by the amendment was to res1trict the 
area in Residential "A" zone where fraternities or 
sororities could be maintained. 
Before the amendment was enacted by the City 
Commission the proposed change was referred to the 
Planning and Zoning Commission, consisting of rep·-
resenta:tive citizens of Salt Lake City, a commission 
created under the provisions of the statutes authorizing 
zoning. This Commission duly considered the advisa-
bility of the amendment by investigating on the ground 
and considering the matter in one of iits meetings .. The 
merits of the amendment were considered and its adop-
tion recommended by· the Planning and Zoning Com-
mission. The City Commission then advertised a public 
hearing on the matter. At the hearing a greait number 
of ·people were presenit and there expresse-d their views, 
some in favor and some against the amendment. After 
the hearing the City Commission passed the amend-
ment (T. page 85-87). 
Exhibit '' C'' i.s a copy of the minutes of the me·et-
ing of the Planning and Zoning Commission at which the 
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propos·ed amendment was considered. Exhibit ''A'' is a 
copy of the p·etition addressed to the ·City Commission 
by 26 residents living in the vicinity of the University 
of Utah requesting the amendment here involved. It 
also contains a copy of the recommendation of the Plan-
ning and Zoning Commission and the order of the City 
Commission directing the advertising of notice of the 
hearing to be held on the propose·d amendment. Exhibit 
'' B '' is a copy of the minutes of the m·eeting 
of the City Commission at which the- hearing on 
ithe proposed amendment was held. The minute-s 
of the Planning and Zoning Commission, Exhibit '' C,'' 
states that the Commission considered the matter of 
''amending said ordinance so as to exclude such esta;.. 
blishments (fraternities and sororities) from that ter-
ritory outside a 1/8 mile radius from the lands and 
premises occupied by the inst~tution to which they are 
incident, meaning in this case the University of Utah." 
From this statem·ent in the minutes of th.e .Planning and 
Zoning Commission plaintiffs conclude that th·e amend-
ing ordinance, as later passed, was directed solely to-
ward and applied only to .the University of Utah. The 
fact is that the University of Utah was, and still is, 
the only ·public educational insltitution in Salt L.ake 
City which p·ermits fraternities and sororities to be 
organized among its students. It is. also true that the 
advocates of the passage of the ordinance were resi-
dents in the neighborhood of the University of Utah, 
but the language of the amendment as p-assed and 
adop~ted by the City Commission is in no way limited 
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5 
t.o the University of Utah but is applicable to any public 
educational institution any,vhere in the City whenever 
such institution is ereated. 
The foregoing shows that the amended ordinance 
complained of was given thorough and careful cons!- -
deratiQn by both the Planning and Zoning Commission 
and by ·the City Commission and by the public before 
it was adopted. There was a difference of opinion among 
the persons expressing their views at the public hear-
ing held to consider_ the matter. The amended ordinance 
received the unanimous approval of both Commissions. 
It stood unquestioned and unassailed for nearly 10 years, 
until plaintiffs brought this action claiming it created 
unlawful discrimination and was unreasonable, arbitrary 
and capricious. It is very important, therefore, that 
the particular position and status of each of the :plain-
tiffs now attacking the amended ordinance be reviewed 
in the light of the record. 
As to plaintiff Hatch the record shows that he ac-
quired his home at 1363 Butler Avenue about 19'32, {T. 
page 43) while the original ordinance was in effect per-
mitting fraternities and sororities to locate in his neigh-
borhood. At that time there were already several fra-
ternities and sororities so located. At the time the 
amendment was- adopted there had already located with-
in the 600 foot area from the lands of the University 
12 fraternities and sororities and 2 were located beyond 
the 600 foot area. Exhibit ''D'' shows these fraternities 
and sororilties existing at the tim·e the amended ordi-
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nance was adopted, such houses being colored yellow. 
Since 1939 only 2 sororities and 1 fraternity have lo ... 
eated within the 600 foot area, one of which is on Butler 
Street, being number 1386, the other being on Federal 
Way and 1st South respectively, a considerable disitance 
from Hatch's residence at 1363 Butler Avenue (T. page 
69-70). These 3 houses are shaded brown on Exhibit 
''D.'' No obj·ection was made by Hatch, or anyone else, 
so far as the record shows to the location of these two 
sororities and one fraiternity. The record is also silent 
as to the likelihood as to any additional fraternities or 
sororities locating in the fores·eeable future within this 
600 foot area. On the contrary, lthe evidence is that the 
plaintiff fraternity failed after 1 year of thorough search 
by a special committee appointed for that purpose to 
find a suitable house for sale within that area, and it was 
for that reason that it purchased the home at 1175 
Second Avenue in defiance of the p·rohibition of the 
amended ordinance (T. page 71-72). ·So far as Hatch 
is concerned, therefore, there is no evidence whatever 
:that any additional fraternities or sororities are likely 
to locate in the 600 foot area or that conditions within 
this area app·ear likely to he changed to his detriment in 
any manner whatsoever by reason of ithe imminency or 
possibility of additional fraternities and sororities lo-
cating therein. Twelve of the 15 fraternities an·d soror-
ities located -within this area were so located before the 
amended ordinance was adopted and wi:thout being com-
pelled so to do. 
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Hatch's ohjection to the amended ordinance is that 
should additional fraternities or sororities locate within 
the 600 foot area there 'vill be additional ltraffic con-
g·estion ( T. page 44) and this 'vill p·rovide additional 
arguments for establishing full year schools in Cedar 
City and Carbon County, whereas, the University alum ... 
nre wish to keep ''a concentrated large school here.'' 
As before stated, there is not the slighteslt evidence in 
the record that any additional fraternities or sororities 
contemplate locating in this 600 foot area or that there 
are any houses or vacant lolt.s available to them for such 
pu:r:pose. In harmony with the foregoing, the trial court 
found, "There is no evidence that any fraternity or 
sorority intends to or will or can now or at any time in 
the future acquire premises within rthe area comp-rising 
the 6QO foot limitation in said ordinance for use as a 
fraternity or sorority house or that any further conges-
tion or crowding of fraternity houses within said area 
is imminent or threatened or is likely. That neither the 
enforcement of the zoning ordinance against the plain-
, 
tiff fraternity's use of the property at 1175 Second 
A venue as a fraternity house, nor the use of said pro~ 
perty as fraternity house will an anywise increase or 
diminish or otherwise affect the congestion, noise or in-
convenience or overcrowded condition already or other-
wise present in the neighborhood of plaintiff Hatch's 
residence, and the enforcement of said ordinance will 
not be p·rejudicial to or discriminatory against plaintiff 
Hatch or other property owners in Residential ''A'' 
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Dis~trict who own property within 600 -feet of the lands 
and premises occupied by the University of Utah.'' 
What are the facts as to the plaintiff fraternity 
that give it standing in court to atttack the amended 
ordinance~ This plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact 
that under the ordinance a fraternity was not p:ermitted 
in a Residential "A" District except within the 600 
foot area. Notwithstanding such knowledge on August 
27, 1948, it entered into a con!tract to purchase the house 
at 117'5 Second A venue, the purchase price being $35,-
000.00 (T. page 77), and th·ereupon occupied and still 
con:tinues to occupy said premises as a fraternity house 
bringing this action after it was threatened with ·prose-
cution ror violating the ordinance. The evidence further 
shows that the frate·rnity could not find a hous·e wilthin 
the 600 foot area suitable for its purposes and within 
the reach of its financial resources although a house 
could have been obtained for the sum of -$40,000.00 cash. 
Plaintiff fraternity had no property rights p·rior to 
the purchas·e of the -house on Second Avenue and it 
acquired that property knowing thaJt its contemplated 
use therof would be in violation of the ordinance. 
Exhibit '' 1'' is a p·art of 'the use district map· cov-
ering ~salt Lake City under the zoning ordinance. The 
red shaded area, with the exception of the rectangular 
area immediately north of the University of Utah, 
shaded green, and having pencil lines running -diagonally 
across the same ('being the 600 fooit area of Residential 
''A'' District here involved) is a portion of the Residen-
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tial '' B ~' Di3trict. This red shaded area ·extends from 
Second East Street east to the University grounds, ex-
tending generally between 4th Avenue and 9th South 
Street under the zoning ordinance. Fraternitie~ and 
sororities are ·permitted within Residential '' B '' District. 
It thus appears that an extensive area of lthe City has 
been left open for the location therein of fraternities 
and sororities. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS CAN ONLY RELY UPO·N THOSE 
FEATURES OF THE ORDINANCE WHICH AFFECT THEM 
IN THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ONLY TO THE EX-
TENT THAT SUCH RIGHTS ARE AFFECTED. 
We wish to refer the court first to a universal prin-
ciple of consltitutional law that will-in itself dispose of 
all clabps of unconstitutional discr~inations made by 
the plaintiffs. It should be remembered, in this connec-
tion, that plaintiff fraternity acquired what interest it 
has in the real property here involved with full know-
ledge of the existence of the Cirty ordinance and that 
it prohibited the use of said prop:erty for a fraternity 
house. As to it there can be no discrimination. It owned 
no property when th·e ordinance was passed. It chose 
to defy ;the ordinance and to put itself in the position 
where it now elaims it is discriminated against; The ord-
inance was passed 10 years ago. Can it now be said that 
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10 
a person who elects to disregard it 10, 15, or 50 years 
after itB passage has any standing in court to say that 
i~t discriminates against him? 
The principle of constitutional law to which we refer 
is stated in 16 C.J.S., page 179, Section 88, as follows: 
''The unconstitutionality of a statute on the 
ground that it denies equal righ·ts and privileges 
by discriminating between persons or classes of 
persons generally may not be raised by one not 
belonging to the class allegedly discriminated 
against.'' 
The same rule is stated in 11 Am Jur. Page 752, 
Section 111, as follows: 
''Even though a person may come within 
the main purpose of a statute, he has no standing 
to raise constitutional questions which do not di-
rectly affect him, for unless a party can show 
that ·he himself has been wrongfully included in 
the terms o£ a law, he can have no just ground 
of compJaint. Hence; a litigant can be heard to 
question the validity of a statute only when, and 
in so far as, i·t is applied to his disadvantage.'' 
In 0'1'1onim v. Adams, 192 U.'S. 108, 28 L. Ed. 365, 
the court held that a saloon keeper cannot challenge 
the consti!tutionality of an ordinance excluding £emales 
from saloons, ·Baying: 
''What cause of action, then has plaintiff in 
error~ He is not a female, nor delegated to cham-
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pion any grievances females may have under the 
ordinance if they have any.'' 
Retz v. Leghsto·n, 10 Cal. App·. 685, 103 P. 363. In 
this case it 'vas held that there where an ordinance 
forbidding saloons except in certain defined limits of 
the city, contained a proviso that existing hotels outside 
such limits might conduct bars, one living outside such 
limits, "\vho had no hotel erected either before or after 
the passage of the ordinance, could not object that the 
ordinance was void because it unreasonably discrimi-
nated between existing hotels and those thereafter built. 
In Joseph Schllitz Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 
286 N. W. 602, the sitatute impoaed an occupational tax 
on operators of grain elevators and warehouses and ex-
empted them from municipal or state taxation. It did 
not impose the tax on owners of grain which is not 
stored in warehouses or elevators. The City of Milwau-
kee attacked the statute claiming it unconstitutional ''be-
cause personal property owned by one !taxpayer and in 
elevators or warehousea would he tax·ed thereunder 
while the same kind of personal p-rop·erty owned by an-
other but not in warehouses or elevators would be sub-
ject to personal property ttax.'' The court says: 
''If there were discriminations, as contended 
by the city, the city is not affected by ~the dis-
crimination and has no standing to raise the con-
stitutional point. This has been so frequently 
heid that it needs no fuf'ther exposition here.'' 
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In Platt v. Phi~brick, 47 P. 2d 302, the statute per-
mitted the lawful occupant of p·rivately owned lands 
to take, hunt, or kill on such lands ·predaJtory or destruc-
tive birds or mammals and to possess ·and carry fire-
arms within the boundaries of the game refuge. No 
one ·else could kill such birds or animals or have or carry 
firearms within the refuge. Plaintiff contended that the 
protection ;to wild game afforded by the statute would 
result in such an increase thereof that her garden might 
be injured by the invasion of predatory birds and wild 
life and that the_ statute was discriminatory between oc-
cupants against nonoccupants. The court held pJaintiff 
could not urge this objection quoting from another de-
cision as follows: 
" 'It is well eatablished that a charge of un-
constitutional discrimination can only be raised 
in a case where this issue is involved in the de~ 
termination of the actioit, and then only by the 
person or a member of the class of persons dis-
criminated against. Estabrook- Co. v. Inc. Ace. 
Com., 177 Cal. 767, 177 P. 848; 5 Cal. Jur. 622, 
~sections 52, 5-3; 6 R. C. L·. 89, Sections 87, 88, 89; 
12. C. J. 768, Section 189.' '' 
Ex Barte Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 P. 1056, 61 A. L. R.-
332. Here Irish was convicted of violating a city ordi-
nance ·of Holton, which p~rovided for p·ayment of a li-
cense fee of $150 per year hy any nonresident who sells 
bread or bakery products in the city. Irish brought a 
writ of habeas corp·us bu!t did not allege he was a non-
resident. The court held that he could not rely on the 
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13 
discrimination between residents and nonresidents say .. 
1ng: 
"In 12 C. J. 760, the rule i.s ·declared to he 
that 'it is a firmly established principle of law 
~that the constitutionality of a statute may not he 
attached by one whose rights are not affected by 
the operation of the statute.' 
''A large list of cases is there cited to sup·· 
port the statement quoted. 12 C. J. 768, says: 
'The unconstitutionality of a statute, on the 
ground that it denies equal rights and privileges 
by discriminating between persons or classes of 
persons, may not be raised by one not belonging 
to the class alleged to be disGriminated against.' '' 
In Heald v. District of 0-o·lumbia, 66 L. Ed. 853, 
259 U.S. 114, the District of Colunihia levied a tax of a 
cel"tain per cent of the yalue of intangible prop'erty~ of 
persons resident or engaged in business within the Dis-
trict. The executors of Peters' estate paid the tax under 
protest and brought suit to recover it back, claiming ~e 
act void becans·e it required every nonresident who 
engages in business in the District to pay the_ tax on 
all property wheresoever siltuated. ·The. Supreme Court 
held this objection was of no avail to the executors 
since all property of the estate was located in the District 
and the owners are residents within lthe District, saying: 
''It has been repeatedly held that one who 
would strike down a state statute as violative of 
the F·ederal Cons~titution must show that he is 
within the class of p·ersons with respect to whom 
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the act is unconstitutional, and that the alleged 
unconstitutional feature injures him.'' 
This same rule is stated by Judge Brandeis in 
Premier-Pabst S~ales ·Co. v. Grosscwp·, 80 L. Ed. 1155, 
298 U. S. 2·26, as follows: 
''We have no occ~sion ;to consider the consti-
tutional question, because it appears .that plain-
tiff is without standing to present it. One who 
would strike down a state statute as ·obnoxious 
to the Federal Constitution, must show that the 
alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.'' 
Our Supreme Court in Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stew·art, 
82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 231, recognized this rule. There 
plaintiff, who was not engaged in selling alcohol but 
would only be a purchaser, contended the sltatute creat-
ing the state alcohol warehouse and giving the ware-
house manufacturer a monoply on the sale of alcohol 
was invalid. The court says : 
'' Plain;tiff contends the law is unreasonable 
and discriminatory. If this were true, we do not 
see how pila.intiff can lawfully complain, since 
there is no discrimination against it or other man-
ufacturers who use alcohol, since all are ·subject 
to the same regulations. Plaintiff is not one who 
seeks to sell in compeit;ition with the manager, but 
a user who is afforded an opportunity to pur .. 
chase through or from the warehouse manager. 
The only manner in which plaintiff and others 
similarly situated claim to be injured is that they 
are required to pay a higher p~rice for alcohol be-
cause of the charges authorized by ·s.taitute to be 
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collected by the manager, and the fees imposed 
by rules and regulations of the Attorney General 
and the Governor. In no other \vay does plain-
tiff allege it is injured in its property or rights." 
The ease of Wu.lfshon v .. Brwden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 
N.E. 120, 43 A. L. R. 651, involved a zoning ordinance. 
The plaintiff sought to erect an apartment house and 
attacked ~the ordinance requiring a certain setback from 
the street and a certain backyard. The court says : 
"Appellant complains ~that the regulations 
for setbacks are unreasonable because they do 
not graduate such setbacks to the size of the 
building but require the same area for a small 
as for a large building. Such an argument is 
not available to him. The only question which 
he is entitled to argue is rthat these setbacks are 
unreasonable in the case of a building four and 
five stories high and designed to accommodate 
nearly 600 p~eople. It will be time enough to con-
sider whether they should not be reduced in the 
case of a smaller building when somebody de-
-siring to- erect such smaller building. complains 
of them as unreasonable.'' 
The_ case of Heimerle v. Village of Bronxville, 5 
N.Y. S. 2d 1002, involved a zoning ordinance and will 
be quoted from extensively later in this brief as, in our 
opinion, it disposes of plaintiffs' case a.s a whole. On 
the question now being discusse-d the court says : 
''The fact that other pro!)erty within the 200 
foot distance in other locations may be unreason-
ably affected, if such fact exists, does not aid 
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the plaintiffs. The only question which the plain-
tiffs are entitled to argue is that the restriction 
is unreasonable as applied to this property. The 
burden of proof on that subject has not been sus-
tained by the plain tiffs.'' 
While we !think the rules of law enunciated by the fore-
going authorities dispose of plaintiffs' case we shall 
proceed to answer their arguments as made under sub-
divisions A, B, C, D, E and F of their brier. We ·Bhall 
, consider each of these· subdivisions under Point II. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIF'FS HAVE GIVEN THE ORDINANCE AN 
ERRONEOUS :CONS,TRUCTION UNDER SUBDIVISIONS A, 
B, C, D, E AND F O·F THEIR BRIEF, AND IN ADDITION 
ARE NO·T ENTITLED TO URGE THE ALLEGED DISCRIM-
INATORY FEATURES THEREIN AS8ERTED. 
A 
The ordinance, subsection (a) prohibits all uses ex-
cep·t those specified therein, for it ·says that in '' Resi-
dential ''A'' District no building or p~remises shall be 
used or maintained, etc., for other than one of the follow-
ing uses.,'' naming them specifically. This all inclusive 
prohibition is then modified in subsection (b) so as to 
permit uses which are ordinarily appurtenant to the 
uses specified in ·subs·ection (a) such as are specifically 
mentioned in lth·e succeeding subdivisions numbered 1 
to 7, inclusive. When subdivision 6 refers to dormitories, 
fraternity or ·sorority houses occupied only hy the faculty 
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of students of public .eduoat~onal institutions, that opens 
·the prohibition in subsection (a) only to the extent ex-
pressed, namely, these houses must he occupied only 
by faculty or students of !public e•ducational institutions. 
This clearly does not permit fraternities in Residential 
''A'' District incident to private schools. Plaintiffs not 
only concede, but argue that the .word ''schools,'' a p,er-
mitted use under subsection (a), include both private 
and public schools. When the incidental us-e permitted 
under subdivision 6 by its language only refers t:o public 
educational institutions it is p·erfectly clear that the City 
authorities were permitting fraternities in a Residen!t.ial 
''A'' District only when incident to a public school. If 
subsection (a) already permitted fraternities in Residen-
tial ''A'' District as a part of a ''school'' the:ve would 
be no need at all of ·Bubsection (b,6) to grant the right. 
We admit there is a distinction made in the ordinance 
.. 
between fraternity houses incident lt:o public schools and 
those incident to private schools, the former being per-
. 
mitted and the latter prohibited. If it be claimed thaJt 
this ·distinction involves an unconstitutional discrimina-
tion, neither of the plainltiffs is in a position to urge 
it, under the law cited above, as neither iB a private 
school, nor is ·either a fraternity seeking to come into 
Residential "A" District as an incidenlt to a p·rivate 
school. Furthermore, there is no showing that the dis-
tinction is an unreasonable one, the burden of proof 
being upon the plaintiff to make such showing. 
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B 
Under subdivision B of their brief plaintiffs like-
wise misconstrue the ordinance and they say that the 
ordinance permits without limitation the number of 
boarde'rs or lodgers who may live in a two-family dwell-
ing. In S·ection (a) every use is prohibited other than 
one-family dwellings, two-family dwellings, etc. Neither 
the words ''one-family dwelling'' nor the words ''ftwo-
family dwelling'' contemplates a use of a dwelling to 
hous-e boarders or lodgers. Without subdivision 5 of sub-
section (b) the use of any dwelling for boarders or lod-
gers would be absolutely forbidden in Residential ''A'' 
District. Subdivision 5 so far removes this ban as to 
permit 6 boarders or lodgers in a one-family dwelling, 
bult · ,e)rpressly says that such p-rovision does not apply 
to a two-family dwelling, and hence no boarders or lod-
gers are permitted in a two-family residence in Residen-
tial ''A''' District That the foregoing is the proper con-
struction of subsection (a) is shown by the fact !that 
under S·ection 6717 (a-2) of the 1944 Revised Ordinance·s, 
boarding or lodging houses for the first time are made 
permissible in Residential '' B '' and '' B-2''' Districts. 
There ·is, therefore, no discrimination beltween two-
family dwellings and fraternity houses, assuming that 
a ·fraternity house is an equivalent of a boarding or 
lo'dging house, as no hoarders or lodgers are p~ermissible 
in a two-family dwelling in Residental ''A'' District. 
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C, D, EAND F 
~Tith respect fo subdivisions C, D, E, and F of 
plaintiffs' brief, we submit the authorities hereinafter 
ap~arin~. ,, ... e desire to add here the following: 
As to subdivision '' C,'' plaintiff Hatch is not any 
more discriminated agains:t than any other person who 
finds himself in a particular zone where other uses than 
one-famly or two-family uses are permitted. If there are 
residences in a commercial zone, there is the natural sub-
jection to new and additional commercial enterp·rises 
coming into the area Ito the detriment of the residential 
feature. Yet commercial zones are s·elected and confined 
in many instances to small areas as was the case in 
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, hereinafter cited and quoted. 
The ordinance attached does not confine fraterniities to 
a 600 foot area. Fraternities are permissible in R·esiden-
tial '' B '' area to lthe west, northwest, and southwest of 
the University. The City ia under no obligaJtion to so 
establish fraternity zones as will provide already built 
houses ·auitable for fraternities. As a matter of fact 
the evidence discloses there are no more houses avail-
able within the 600 foot area and lthat the plaintiff fra-
ternity for that reason went outside that area. All-
other fraternities were established without any action 
being ltaken by plaintiff Hatch. ·To strike the ordinance 
down in this case will not in any wise relieve Hatch. 
All the fraternities and sororities that could locate 
within the 600 foot area have already done ·Bo and· all 
but two did so while the entire area of Residential ''A'' 
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was open and available to them. To reopen Residential 
''A'' to fraternities and sororities will not prevent new 
ones from locating within the 600 foot area if a sui!table 
house can there be obtained. The ordinance fixing the 
600 foot limitation was passed in January, 1939. No action 
was taken by Hatch during the ten year interval against 
this ordinance. Neither the complainlt nor the evidence 
shows any necessity now for his taking the present action 
for the evidence· shows that the plaintiff fraternity could 
not and did not acquire a hou·se wiithin the 600 foot limi-
tation. Consequently the-re is no threat now of any addi .. 
tional burden upon Hatch. So whether the fraternity 
should he p·ermitted to use the house on is:econd Ave .. 
nue for a chapter is of no concern to Hatch. Striking 
down the ordinance will not cause any of the frater-
nities already located to move. There will be just as much 
traflic congestion and other disturbances incident to fra-
ternities and sororities in Hatch's neighborhood regard-
less of. whether the plaintiff fraternity is or is not per-
mitted in· the Second Avenue house. There is no evidence 
that any other fraternity is threaJtening to invade this 
600 foot area while the evidence is to the effect that there 
is no house now available within that area for a fraJter-
nity. The. evidence further discloses that there are num-
erous houses in close proximity to the University in 
Residential '' B '' which are of such a character as to 
be suitable for fraternilties and sororities. There is 
absolutely no ·showing, therefore, why the extraordinary 
remedy of injunction should be invoked in this case in 
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behalf of plaintiff Hatch or why the ordinance should 
be declared invalid as to him. 
- As to subdivision D of p~aintiffs' brief, all we need 
to say is that ~the ordinance was passed by the City Com-
mission and what was intended must be drawn from the 
language of the ordinance itself. No mention is made 
therein of the University of Utah. The language is 
general and would apply to any public ·educational in-
stitution, now or hereafter established, in a Residen-
tial ''A'' District. The fact that for the time being the 
University is the only such institution where fraternities 
and sororities are organized and have chapter houses 
cannot be taken as evidence that the ordinance was di-
rected toward the University and applicable only to fra-
ternities and sororities of that instiltution. Salt Lake 
City is the only first class city in the State of Utah. 
Is it to be contended that all legislation concerning first 
class cities is for that reason directed to Salt Lake City 
alone and is, therefore, class legislation and so void~ 
As to subdivision E and F of plaintiffs' brief we 
feel that the authorities hereinafter referred to amply 
answer the contentions ma:de by counsel. 
It is apparent that the two plaintiffs in this case 
occupy conflicting positions. The fraternity asserts that 
there is no such distinction in law or fact between houses 
occupied by fraternities and houses occupied by one 
or two families as would form a reasonable basis for 
separate treatment of fraternities by the ordinance. 
Hatch, on the other hand, claims fraternities are a de-
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triment to a strictly residential district and create con-
ditions which should not he permitted to exist in such 
district. He claims the location of fraternities in his 
neighborhood has materially reduced the value of his 
property and the future location of fraternities will 
destroy the value thereof. This clearly shows that there 
is a reasonable basis for treating fraternities as a class 
in fixing proper zoning restrictions. The sam~ consider-
ations are present as regards fraternities in a strictly 
- ' 
residential area as are present in lodging or boarding 
houses in such an area. 
POINT III 
GREEK LETTER FRATERNITY, MAY BE EXCLUDED 
FRO·M RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT UNDER ZONING LAW. 
Pet~is v. Alpha AZpha Chapter ~of Phi Bet.a Pi, 115 
Neb. 525, 213 N. W. 835. 'The fraternity entered into an 
agreement to purchase a large residence piroperty for 
the sum of $2·5,000 paying $:6000 down and giving a 
mortgage for the halance. The prop·erty was located 
in residential A district which permitted only one and 
two family dwellings, churches, schools, libraries, parks, 
playgrounds, farming and truck gardens,· hospitals or 
institutions of an educational philanthropic eleemosy-
nary nature, and accessory buildings. The fraternity 
argued that the owner had a right to sell the prope·rty 
to the fraternity for the exclusive residential use as a 
family withl.n the meaning of the city ordinance. 
"The ordinance, however, does not ap·pear 
to uphold counsel's construction of the word 
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'fan1ily' as used -in the above cited ''A'' residence 
district section. Has it come to ·pass that a com-
pany of approximately 20 or 30 unrelated young 
faternity men ran properly come 'vithin the gen-
erally arrepted n1eaning of the social uni~t which 
is designated as a family~ We do not think so . 
.... t\nd counsel's contention in respect of the family-
rights feature of the defendant fraternity is 
plainly negatived by the express provision that 
"fraternities', and other designated occupants as 
well, may be installed under the 'B' section of 
the ordinance. Clearly the fraternity is confined 
to the 'B' section. 
''Plaintiffs point out that, if the judgment of 
the trial coUitt is sustained, the students will lodge 
in the Allis-on house and be served with two meals 
each day. And, of course, from time to time, more 
room will be added to accommodate the future 
influx of students in attendance at a large, in-
fluential and rapidly growing university. Plain-
'tiffs also contend that such use of the house 'will 
cause confusion on account of the numbers living 
in said house ; will depreciate the value of the 
plaintiffs' ·p·rop·erty, and other property in the 
neighborhood; will cause .confusion because of 
the p~escence of automobiles owned by members 
of said fraternity, and because of the proximity 
of the plaintiffs, the firs't named plaintiff being 
within 20 feet of said house and the others being 
immediately across the street therefrom plain-
tiffs will be specially damaged,' by reason of its 
proximity. It is shown that 'these ~three homes 
are all of the value of over ·$50,000 each, and are 
typical of the district,' and that many like resi-
dences will be greatly depreciated in value in the 
event that the defendants prevail in this suit. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
''Plaintiffs gladly concede in the brief that 
the proposed young men occupants of the defend-
ant fraternity house are high-class and well-be-
haved in their demeanor. But it will be presumed 
that they are not different from any equal num-
ber of young men students in somewhat similar 
situations at the other seats of learnings. Han-
nan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N. W. 255, 45 
A. L. R. 1119, is a case arising in Milwaukee 
wherein the court made this observation: 
'' 'The occupancy of the upper flat of the 
dwelling house as headquarters and clubrooms 
of a college fraternity amounts to a constructive 
eviction of the tenant of the lower flat and a 
breach of an implied covenant for quiet enjoy-
ment, entitling the tenant to an injunction to 
restrain such breach. ' 
"And in the statement of facts, at page 256 
(189 "\Vis. 589'), sp·eaking of college students gen-
erally, the court observed that it is a matter of 
common knowledge and well established that 
groups of students are for the most part ·exuber-
ant, boisterous, and hilarious, and that they do 
not ordinarily keep regular hours and are ad-
dicted to the use and abuse of vibrant and sonor-
ous musical instruments. 
''In a zoning case decided in 1925, the_ ques-
tion of the police . power as relating thereto is 
discussed at length, and the court, in an unusually 
instructive opinion, say: 
'' 'The police power, as such, is not con-
fined within the narrow circumscription of ·pre-
cedents, resting upon past conditions which do 
not cover and control p·resent-day· conditions ob-
viously calling for revised regulations to pro-
mote the health, safety, morals, or general wei-
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fare of the public; that is to say, as a common-
wealth develops politically, economically, and 
socially, the police power likewise develop~s, with-
in reason, to meet the changed and changing con-
ditions. What was at one time regarded as an im-
·p·roper exercise of the police p·ower may now, be-
cause of changed living conditions, be recognized 
as a legitimate exercise of that power. ~ * * In 
its inception the police power was closely con-
cerned with the preservation of the public peace, 
safety, morals, and health without specific re-
gard for 'the general welfare.' The increasing 
complexity of our civilization and institutions 
later gave rise to cases wherein the promotion 
of ·the public welfare, was held by the courts to 
be a legitimate object for the exercise of the police 
power. As our civic life has developed, so has the 
definition of 'public welfare,' until-it has heen 
held to embrace regulations 'to ~promote the eco-
nomic welfare, public convenience and general 
prosperity of the community.' Miller v. Board of 
Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381, 38 A. L. R. 
1479." 
The court reversed judgment for the fraternity 
enjoining the City from enforcing the ordinance. 
The above case was followed in the case of o·ity of 
Limcoln v. Loga.'Yir--Jones, 120 Neb. 827, 235 N.W. 583, 
where it was held that a Greek letter fraternity violates 
the zoning ordinance.s of a city when it occupies and 
uses in an exclusive residential district a residence as 
a chapter house. 
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POINT IV 
THE \VISDO·M AND NECESSITY FOR THE ZONING, 
THE NUMBER AND NA'TURE OF THE DISTRICTS CRE-
ATED, AND THE BOUNDARIES THER.EOF AND THE 
USES PERMITTED THEREIN ARE M~TTERS WHICH LIE 
WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE GOVERNING BODY 
OF THE CITY. 
Under ~s~ection 15-8-90 U.C.A. 1943 the legislature 
has vested broad p~o.wer and discretion in the govern-
ing body of the city in establishing zoning regulations 
and use districts. We quote : 
'' 15-8-90. Districts. 
'' Fnr any or all of said p·urposes the legisla-
tive body may divide the municipality into dis-
tricts of such number, shape and area as may be 
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of 
this article, and within such districts it may reg-
ulate and restrict the erection, construction, re-
construction, alteration, repair or use of buildings 
or structures, or the use of land. All such reg-
ulations shall be uniform for each class or kind 
of buildings throughout each district, but the 
regulations in one district may differ from those 
in other districts.'' 
Ma;rshall v. Salt Lake c·ity, 141 P. 2d '704. ·This case 
lays down the point above stated and states that: 
''Unless the action of such body is arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or un·reasonable or clearly of-
fends some provision of the constitution or sta-
tute, the court must uphold it if within the grant 
of powe-r to the municipality. It is primarily 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
27 
the duty of the city to 1nake the classifications if 
a clasaification is reasonably doubtful. The judg-
ment of the court "~ill not be substituted for the 
judg~nent of the city. The requiremenl tha,t zon-
ing be by disf1~icts does not require that dist.ricts 
be conf,ined a.nd rigitdly limli,ted to one p~articvula,r 
type of 1.tse/' 
On the question of what is a reasonable exercise 
of the police power, the court saya: 
''The p·reservation of the public health, mor-
als, safety and welfare are not to be -determined 
or gauged in dollars and cents alone, nor in p·ro-
tection from contagious diseases or moral char-
latans. The public health involves the preserva-
tion of the mental, moral, and civic health of the 
inhabitants as well as physical health. A citizenry 
mentally alert and alive to the interests of the 
city and its ~abitants, filled with pride and 
confidence in ·the community and nation, awake 
to its weaknesses, needs and , possibilities, is as 
much a matter of p·ublic concern and effort, as 
is the prevention of epidemics. Again, a men-
tally healthy and alert citizenship is one of the 
most effective ways of preserving the physical 
health. So, too, the moral health of the p.eople is 
a matter of grave public concern. The higher the 
sense of public responsibility, of private eitizens 
and public officers alike, the greater the assur-
ance of safety in person, liberty, and property. 
The higher the. moral tone, the morale of the 
people, the cleaner will be the city, the more beau-
tiful the homes and parks ; the more peace and 
quiet that abounds, the greater the joy and life 
and living in the community. The public health, 
safety, morals, and welfare, as those terms are 
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used with reference to government and its ex-
ercise of police power are insep·arably linked to, 
and founded upon, the peace of mind, happiness 
and contentment of its citizens. A government 
such as ours is merely a form for cooperative 
action, set up by free men, to enable them to live 
and operate as a unit, insuring the preservation 
to each of life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness, and imposing only such restrictions upon 
the individual as shall be necessary to p·res·erve 
and p·rotect the welfare of society as a whole. A 
chain is no stronger than its weakest link, so 
society is no better or stronger than the units 
of, and upon, which it is builded. The unit upon, 
and out of which our present society is built is 
the family and the home. A basic and very im-
portant element in determining public welfare, 
especially as applied to regulations and restric-
tions governing residences and residential pro-
perty, is its need or effect upon the homes ana 
home life of the people. It is certainly the p~rerog­
ative, and probably the duty of organized society, 
to take those measures and do those things which 
tend to preserve in their beauty, integrity and 
social force, the homes and homelife of its citi-
zens. Those things, therefore, which contribute 
or reasonably may contribute to the convenience 
and enjoyment. of the family home, and the home-
life of the p·eople generally, in such a way as may 
affect their health, safety, morals and gene'ral 
welfare are within the scope of the police power, 
and may properly. form the basis for action by 
the city in zoning. 
''As to what restrictions and limitations 
should be imposed upon prop~erty, and what uses 
thereof should be pe·rmitted, has been hy tlie 
legislature, committed to the judgnlent and dis-
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cretion of the governing body of the city. As 
long as that body atays within the grant, and pur-
poses fixed by the legislature, the courts will not 
gainsay (its) judgment. In Walton v. Tracy 
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92· P. 2d 724, 
726, we said: 'No one would doubt that the ex-
ercise of the zoning power is definitely a legis-
lative function and activity.' 
"The court, in Zahn v. Board of Public 
Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388, at page 395, 
says: ' It must be conceded that, where a given 
situation admittedly presents a proper field for 
the exercise of the police power, the extent of the 
invocation and application is -a matter which lies 
very largely in legislative discretion (State ex 
rel.) (Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 149·, 196 N.W. 
451) (33 A.L.R. 269'), and we are well satisfied 
that the weight of authority dealing with the sub-
ject of zoning may now be regarded as establish-
ing that 'every intendment is to he made in favor 
of zoning ordinances, and courts will not, except 
in clear cases, interfere with exercise of power 
thus manifested.' 
''And in Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty, su-
pra, we read: 'If the validity of the legislative 
classification * * * be fairly debatable, the legis-
lative judgment must be allowed to control.' '' 
Wilkins v. City iof San Be~r.ward'ino, 175 P. 2d 542. 
''Plaintiff sought declaratory relief, claim-
ing that the zoning ordinance of the city of San 
Bernardino was unreasonable and invalid as ap-
plied to the west 112 feet of his p·roperty because 
that portion was placed in a single family dwell-
ing zone. The remainder of this property is lo-
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cated in a small or 'spot' business zone which is 
in the center of a large residential district, zoned 
for single family dwellings. Plaintiff, in sub-
stance, is attempting to obtain an extension of 
one arm of this small business zone by judicial 
decree, contrary to the legislative determination 
by which the boundaries of the zone were esta-
blished.'' 
Plaintiff had erected multiple dwellings and garages 
on the middle portion of the lots east of the disputed 
westerly 112 feet. He applied twice for re-zoning which 
was denied and then obtained a permit to erect single 
family two-story dwellings and garages on the west 112 
feet of these lots. Instead of erecting single family 
dwellings, however, he erected two multiple family units 
in violation of the zoning ordinance. 
''In the p·resent case, there is no contention 
that the zoning ordinance as a whole is invalid, 
but only that its application to part of plaintiff's 
property is unreasonable and hence we must as-
sume, in accordance with the rule that every in-
tendment is in favor of the validity of such ordi-
nances, that the enactment as a whole is a p·roper 
·exercise of the police power and adapted to p·ro-
mote the public health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare. Th,is being so, the sole question 
is whether the ap·plication of the ordinance to 
plaintiff's property is so oppressive and unrea-
sonable as to justify the granting of relief, o:r 
whether there was any reasonable justification 
for the legislation as applied to p1aintiff's pro-
perty so as to make the action of the city in 
denying plaintiff's applications for re-zoning, a 
legitimate exercise of the police power. A city 
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cannot unfairly discriminate against a particular 
parcel of land, and the courts may properly in-
quire as lt;o whether the scheme of classification 
has been applied fairly and impartially in each 
instance. Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 
251, 83 P. 2d 29. But the mere fact that some 
hardship is experienced is not material, since 
'Every exercise of the police power is apt to 
affect adversely the property interest of some-
body.' Zah.n v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 
497, 512, 234 P. 388, 394. It is implicit in the 
theory of police power that an individual cannot 
complain of incidental injury, if the power is 
exercised for prop-er purposes- of public health, 
safety, morals and general welfare, and if there 
is no arbitrary and unreasonable application in 
the _particular case. 
"Where it is claimed that the ordinance is 
unreasona:ble as applied to plaintiff's p·roperty, 
o·r that a change in conditions has rendered appli-
cation of the ordinance unreasonable, it is incum-
bent on plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence 
from which the court c-an make such findings aa 
to the physical facts involved as will' justify it 
in concluding, as a matter of law, that the ordi-
nance is unreasonable and invalid. It is not suf-
ficient for him to show that it will he more pro-
fitable to him to make other use of his property, 
or that such other use will not cause injury to 
the public, but he must show an abuse of discre-
tion on the p·art of the zoning authorities and 
that there has be·en an unreasonable and unwar-
ranted exercise of the police power. See Rehfeld 
v. City, etc. of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 85, 21 
P. 2d 41'9. Every intendment is in favor of the 
validity of the exercise of police power, and, even 
though a court might differ from the determin-
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ation of the legislative body, if there is a rea-
sonable haais for the belief that the esta;blishment 
of the strictly residential district has substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals or 
general welfare, the zoning measure will be 
deemed to. be within the purview of the police 
power. Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal. 2d 341, 344, 
115 P. 2d 455; Miller v. Board of Public Works, 
195 Cal. 477, 490, 2·34 P. 381, 38 A. L. R. 1479; 
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, _195 Cal. 497, 
234 P. 388; see Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52 
Cal. App. 2d 605, 614, 126 P. 2d 954. 
'' The courts cannot write the zoning laws 
and cannot say that the legislative body has 
erred in drawing the lines of the districts, or in 
restricting the territory devoted to business or 
to multiple dwellings, unless there is a clear 
showing of abuse of legislative discretion, i.e., 
that the restrictions are unreasonable: A-s stated 
in Miller v. Board of Public Works, 19'5 Cal. 477, 
493, 495, 234 P. 381, 387, 38 A. L. R. 14 79, 'The 
man who is seeking to ·establish a permanent 
home would not deliberately choose to build next 
to an apartment house, and it is common experi-
ence that the man who has already built is dis-
satisfied with his home location and desires a 
change. * * * Somewhere the line of demarca-
tion must be drawn, and it is primarily the p•rO-
vince of the municipal body to which the zoning 
function is committed to draw that line of demar-
cation, and it is neither the province nor the duty 
of courts to interfere with the discretion with 
which such bodies are invested in the absenc·e of 
a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. 
In short, as previously indicated, we are not per-
mitted to substitute ·our judgment for the legis-
lative judgment.' 
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''So-called 'spot' zoning results in th·e crea-
tion of two types of 'islands.' As pointed out 
above, the objectionable type arises when the 
zoning· authority improperly limits the use which 
may be made of a small parcel located in the 
center of an unrestricted area. The second type 
of 'island' results when most of a large district 
is devoted to a limited or restricted use, but ad-
ditional uses are permitted in one or more 'spots' 
in the district. It is the second type of 'island' 
that is presented in this case and if there is any 
discrimination, it is in favor of the 'island' since 
it may be devoted to a greater number of uses 
than the surrounding territory. It is clearly 
within the discretion of the legislative body of 
the city to determine whether such an 'island' 
should be enlarged or not, and the mere fact that 
the owner may enjoy greater benefits, or that 
his property will be enhanced in value, if the 
size of the island is increased, cannot entitle him 
to compel the allowance of such increase in size. 
Herfeld v. City, etc., of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 
83, 21 P. 2d 419; See Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 
52 Cal. App. 2d 605, 126 P. 2·d 954; Kort v. ·City 
of Los Angeles, 52 ·Cal. App. 2d 804, 127 P~ 2d 
66; Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal. 2d 119, 
104 P. 2d 1041. Zoning necessarily involves 
boundary problems and, when 'spots'· zoning is 
permitted in a residential district, the legisla-
tive body must determine where the boundary 
is to be placed, attempting, as far a:s possible, 
to minimize the resu1ting inconvenience. This is 
essentially a legislative problem, and the determi-
nation may be attacked only if there is no reason-
able basis therefor. Often there may be little dif-
ference in the character of the property on either 
side of the line, but ·such showing will not justify 
a judicial alteration or extension of the boundaries. 
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If an owner could compel the extension of the 
boundaries of the 'island,' by any such showing, 
then the next adjoining owner in turn could like-
wise make the same kind of a showing and obtain 
another extension of the 'island' to his property, 
and in a short time there would be an end to the 
effectivness of all zoning legislation.'' 
T~aimtor v. Bat:temer, 72 N. Y. 'S~. 2d 537. Plaintiff 
brought an action under the Declaratory Judgments 
Acts to have a zoning ordinance declared invalid. The 
plaintiffs further complain that the zoning change made 
by the Town Board wherein the land herein referred 
to, including the portion of the 'roadway,' was changed 
from a residential zone to an industrial zone, was done 
arbitrarily and unreasonably and constitutes an unrea-
sonable, illegal, confiscatory exercise of zoning power 
and that the change of zone deprives the plaintiffs of 
their prop·~rty without due process of law and denies 
plaintiffs the equal p·rotection of the laws. 
''With respect to the change of zone, it must 
be remembered that the action of the Town Board 
complained of constituted a legislative act. No 
machinery for the review of the action of the 
Town Board in making change in the zoning ordi-
nance is provided in the Town Law, the reason 
therefor being that within constitutional limits 
the Town Board is the sole judge as to what law 
·should be enacted for the protection and welfare 
of the people and as to when the police power 
which it possesses is to be exercised. It is true that 
an exercise of the police power will be scrutinized 
by the courts to determine whether or not it is 
unconstitutional in that it unreasonably and ar-
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bitrarily deprives a p·erson of the use of hia 
property. So long as the action of the Town 
Board does not infringe upon. the inherent rights 
of life and liberty and the enjoyment of property, 
either directly or through some limitation there-
on, a determination as to the necessity for the 
exercise of the police power is conclusive upon 
the court. The discretion of the legislative body 
is very broad and become.s the subject of super-
vision by the court only when it becomes neces-
sary to ·determine whether or not it has been 
exercised within proper limitations. Green Point 
Savings Bank , v. Board of Zoning Apip·eals of 
Town of Hempstead, 281 N.Y. 534, at pages 539, 
540, 24 N.E. 2d 319, at pages 321, 322. No facts 
are alleged in the complaint showing that the 
Town Board exercised its ·power.s beyond the 
proper ·limitations or that its action was unrea-
sonable and arbitrary. The plaintiffs" by this 
form of relief seek to obtain in this action the 
determination that the zoning change was made 
illegally. ·There is no claim that the procedure 
adopted in making the change was improper. 
The plaintiffs merely claim that the result of the 
change was not in the best interests of the p·lain-
tiffs and others similarly situated. 
''No reported case in this State has been 
drawn to the attention of the court wherein any 
court has reviewed by declaratory judgment such 
a determination as was made by the Town Board 
in this case. True, in M·atter of Dowsey v. Village-
of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427, 86 
A.L .. R. 642, the court p·ermitted a taxpayer to 
attack a zoning ordinance by way of a declara-
tory judgment. But as to that ca.se the Court of 
Appeals in Arverne Bay Construction Comp·any · 
v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, at page 226, 15 N.E. 
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2d 587, at page 589, 117 A.L.R. 1110, narrowed 
its construction as follows : 
" 'The rule established by that case is this: 
To sustain an attack upon the validity of the 
ordinance an aggrieved property owner must 
show that if the ordinance is enforced the con-
sequent restrictions upon his property preclude 
its use for any purpose to which it is re·asonably 
adapted.' 
''There are no allegations whatsoever in the 
complaint herein to indicate that the plaintiffs 
are unable to use their property for any purpose 
to which it is reasonably adapted. 
''In the exercise of sound discretion, the 
court deems the various issues here involved no~ 
to be subject of a declaratory judgment. The dis-
cretionary power of the court in an action for 
a declaratory judgment should be invoked only 
where a resort to ordinary actions or proceedings 
would not afford adequate relief. Rockland Light 
& Power Co. v. City of New York, 289 N.Y. 45, 
43 N.E. 2d 803.'' 
POINT V 
·THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE ZONING ORDI-
NANCE IS VALID AND THE BURDEN IS ON THE ONE 
CHA·LLENGING THE ORDINANCE TO PROVE ITS IN-
VALIDITY. 
Repp. v. Shahadi, 132 N. J. L. 24, 38 A. 2d 284. 
''It is now well established that where a 
zoning ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the 
powers granted by the- zoning statute, within the 
purview of the zoning amendment to the consti-
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tution, the muncipal enactment will be ·sustained. 
The presumption is that the regulations are rea-
sonable unless the contrary is shown.'' 
Pass v. Town ~of Bloomfield, 49' A. 2d 476. 
The defendant town amended its zoning or-
dinance to create a new zone classified as a gar-
den type ap·artment residential zone. The pro-
perty affected comprised 21 acres, being a part 
of Lot 1, Block 970, and used as a small public 
golf course. It was bounded on the north by 
farm land, on the south by Glen Ridge Golf 
Course, on the east by Third. River and on the 
west by Glen Ridge Golf Course. The property 
was zoned for 1 family dwellings. The court says 
''we find no evidence to overcome the presump-
tion of validity." 
Zadwotr'YIIJ} v. ~City :of Chicago, 380 Ill. 470, 44 N.E. 
2d 426. 
''.An ordinance enacted in the exercise of 
power confered upon a municip~ality enjoys a pre-
sumption in favor of its validity, and it is in-
cumbent upon one attacking it as unreasonable 
and oppres·sive to show affirmatively and cle'arly 
that such charge is true.'' 
De Bartolo v. Village :of O·ak Park, 396 Ill. 404, 71 
N.E. 2d 693. 
Plaintiff sought to convert her single family resi-
dence into a 2 family residence. Her property was within 
50 feet of prop•erty zoned as comm·ercial. There were 
2 other houses in the ·same block used for 2 family resi-
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dences, but these were constructed and so used before 
passage of the zoning ordinance. The commercial zone 
was separated from the 1 family residence area by a 
16 foot area. Plaintiff contends that since there were 
already some 2 family residences in the same block as 
her property and that a portion of the block ·south of the 
alley was zoned for commercial use renders the ordi-
nance invalid as to her property. The court says: 
''A zoning· ordinance is presumed to be valid. 
The burden is upon the one assailing such an or-
dinance to overcome this assumption . . . It is 
axiomatic that zoning must begin somewhere and 
end somewhere. Some property in a commercial 
zone must be near, or even adjoin property in a 
residential zone. The very nature of a zoning 
ordinance requires that certain desirable neigh-
borhoods adjoin others which are less desirable. 
There is no evidence in the record touching the 
question of any diminution in the value of plain-
tiff's prop·erty because it is zoned for single fam-
ily residence purposes.'' 
Dupage ·C.ournty v-. Hernderson, 83 N.E. 2d 720. 
''The ordinance is presumed to be valid, and 
the burden of showing it unreasonable and op-
p·ressive, as applied to app·ellants, rested upon 
them. Their showing had to be clear and con-
clusive. All that they have shown is that they 
purchased the property knowing it was subject 
to the zoning ordinance restriction against carry-
ing on a manufacturing business thereon. The 
violation of the ordinance is admitted. They have 
not shown that the particular restriction, as ap ... 
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plied to then1, is not a proper exercise of the 
police power in th·at it does not have a substan-
tial relation to the general welfare of the people 
about them. 
''The fact the ordinance permitted a large 
number of uses within the district, "'rhich the ap-
pellants deemed more detrimental to the p•eople 
and their property, can neither diminish nor 
enlarge their defense, for those other uses are 
not theirs. The fact that nonp.ermissive uses ·ar~ 
carried on by others contrary to the ordinanc~ 
neither fortifies nor weakens the case of appel-
lants, but each alleged violation of the ordinance 
is a complete case within itself and must stand 
or fall upon the facts and circumstances of that 
case alone. The appellants charge in this court 
that the classification of their property as non-
industrial in the ordinance amounts to a capri.A 
cious invasion and an unreasonable invasion of 
their property rights. The !presumption .of the 
validity of that classification must be overcome by 
proof made by defe'ndants w·hich is cZe:ar a;nd 
convinc!irng. City of Springfield v. Vancil, 398 Ill. 
575, 7·6 N.E. 2d 471. The defendants have not sup-
plied the proof required. The uses permitted 
and forbidden in the '' F'' district were the result 
of the considered judgment of the zoning com-
mission and the board of supervisors, all based 
upon a survey and analysis of the area involved 
by competent persons. The fact such judgment 
may lead to an honest difference of opinion, which 
leaves the subject open for debate, does not war-
rant this court intruding in the role of a zoning 
commission. All questions concerning the wi·s-
dom ·or desirability of particular restrictions in 
a zoning ordinance must be addressed to the 
legislative body specifically cha·rged with determ-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
1n1ng them. Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman, 
369 Ill. 207, 1'6 N .E. 2d 131.'' 
Yoemans v. Hillsb·ovrough, tp. 135· N.J.L. 599, 54 A. 
2d 202. 
''One attacking a zoning ordinance as un-
reasonable is met by the presumption that the 
ordinance i.s reasonable and must bear the burden 
of establishing the contrary.'' 
Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 13 N.W. 2d 
634. In this case experts testified that the natural de-
velopment of the area required that plaintiff's tract be_ 
made commercial instead of '' AA'' Residen:tial District 
since it fronted upon a through highway whereon 9660 
. veh~cles passed daily, creating a lot of noise and dam-
age; that it was unsuited for residential purposes; that 
a shopping center would be a convenience as the nearest 
is 3000 feet distant; that the plaintiff's property would 
be cheapened by erection of one family residences; that 
its value for commercial uses would be from $50,000 to 
$91,800 while without plaintiff's proposed development 
it would only. he from $1500 to $13,000 ... The defen-
dants ·showed the surrounding prop·erty was built up 
by fine homes ; that these properties would be greatly 
depreciated in value if the area was commercial; that 
there was already more than sufficient commercial area 
for the city; that nearby was a Catholic Church, a public 
park, the University of Omaha, a coeducational school. 
The court concluded the zoning of plaintiff's property 
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as Residential '' AA'' was not arbitrary or un·reasonable 
. 
saJing: 
"In determining the validity of a city or-
dinance regularly passed in the exercise of po-
lice power, the court will presume that the city 
council acted with full knowledge of the condi-
tions relating to the subject of municipal legis-
lation. 
''That the zoning ordinance, otherwise valid, 
limits use and depreciates value of property, is 
no reason for holding void ordinance passed in 
the interest of public welfare. Effective zoning 
necessarily comprehends prohibitions against cer-
tain uses in named districts and restriction as to 
area of lots to be built upon.'' 
Bwirkholder v. City ~of Sterllim,g, 381 Ill. 564, 46 N.E. 
2d 45. Here plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of 
an ordinance amending a zoning ordinance to classify 
as Commercial an area theretofore classified as Resi-
dential. A hearing was had before the amendment was 
adopted at which prop·erty owners appeared both for 
and against the amendment. The court says : 
''It has been repeatedly stated by this court 
that it will not constitute itself a zoning com-
mission and that all questions relative to the 
wisdom or desirability of particular restrictions 
in a zoning ordinance rest with the legislative 
bodies creating them and that a finding will not 
be disturbed where there is ground for a legiti-
mate difference of opinion concerning the reason-
ableness of a particular ordinance. It is not the 
province of the courts to interfere with the dis-
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cretion of the legislative body in the absence of 
a clear showing of an abuse of a discretion vested 
in them. Where the advisability of restricting a 
particular area for a p·articular use is debatable, 
this court will not substitute its judgment for that 
of the legislative body charged with the primary 
duty and responsibility of determining the ques-
tion. 
''From a review of the factB it is obvious 
that the advisability of adopting ordinance No. 
752 (the amendment) was debatable. The pro-
perty owners who were directly concerned in the 
matter were about evenly divided. The commi-. 
tee that conducted the first hearing, and the city 
council approved the re-zoning ordinance and the 
chancellor confirmed their action. Under such 
circumstances this court cannot do otherwise than 
affirm the decree.'' 
The court dismissed the complaint for want of 
equity. 
City .of Tusoon v. Arizorna Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495, 
2.72 P. 923. Before any ordinance was p~assed restricting 
the place where mortuaries could he located, the Arizona 
Mortuary purchased a traet in a residential area, ob-
tained a permit authorizing construction thereon of a 
mortuary, let a contract and commenced work. When 
the p·eople in the -vicinity became aware of what was 
intended they protested to the city council. An investi--
gation was made and an o~dinance was piassed prohibit-
ing mortuaries except in the· business district, where all' 
other mortuaries were already located. The Mortuary 
claimed the ordinance was invalid. The lower court held 
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this residential district already had ·.some business esta-
blishments and was rapidly giving way to business, and 
was very suitable to mortuary business and enjoined 
enforcement of the ordinance. The supreme court re-
versed the decision saying: 
''As we have .seen by the foregoing quota-
tions from the Euclid Case (Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L~.R. 
1016), neither the mere fact that the natural de-
velopment of a district was toward industrial en-
terprise and that the normal and reasonably to he 
expected future use of certain p-roperty was for 
industry and trade purposes, nor the fact that 
property, if used for business purposes, would 
be of more value than if u.sed for residential, will 
justify the court in finding unconstitutional an 
ordinance which checks or defeats such develop-
ment or diverts it to another district. 
"It is the rule in all cases involving the val-
idity of the exercise of the police power that 
courts will interfere with the action of the legis-
lative authority only when it is plain and p·alpable 
that the ordinance has no real or substantial 
relation to the general welfare and tha~t it 1s 
unrea.sonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory.'' 
Cassel Re1alty ·OompOfYIIJJ.V. City :of O.maha, 14 N.W. 
2d 600. 
"In an action in court to enjoin the enforce-
ment of a zoning ordinance on the ground that it 
is unrea.sonable, arbitrary and confiscatory it is 
necessary to indulge the preS,:umption that the 
City Commission in th·e enactment was in pos-
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session of the fact relating to the necessity for 
the zoning restriction and that its legislation re-
lated and responded to such necessitous condi-
tion.'' 
Miller v. Board of PwbUc Works, Cal. 2·34 P. 381, 
38 A. L. R. 1479. 
''Whenever the recognized purposes for 
which the police power may be called in to play 
or suhserved either by exclusion or segregation 
of any business, it may be thus regulated. This 
is but anothe·r way of saying that any zoning 
regulation is a valid exercise of the police power 
which is necessary to subserve the ends for which 
the police power exista, namely, the promotion 
of the public health, safety, morals, and general 
welfare. It will thus be seen that the police power, 
as evidenced in zoning ordinances, has a much 
wider scope than the mere suppression of the of-
fensive uses of property, and that it acts, not only 
negatively, hut cons~tructively and affirmatively, 
for the promotion of the public welf.are. 
''As our civic life has developed so has the 
definition of 'public welfare,' until it has been 
held to embrace regulations 'to promote the 
economic welfare, public conv_enience, and general 
prosperity of the community.' 
''Courts are loath to substitute their judg-
ment as to the necessity for a particular enact-
ment, for the legislative judgment as to the need 
of such enactment with reference to the exercise 
of the police power. A large discretion is vested in 
the legislative branch of the government with 
reference to the exercise of the police power. 
Every intendment is to be indulged in by the 
courts in favor of the validity of its exercise 
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and, unless the measure is clearly opp·ressive, it 
will be deemed to be within the purview of that 
power. It is only when it is p·alpable that the 
measure in controversy has no real or substan-
tial relation to the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare, that it will be nullified by the 
courts. The courts may differ with the legislature 
as to the wisdom or propriety of a particular 
enactment as a means of accomplishing a partic-
ular end, but as long as there are considerations 
of public health, safety, morals or general welfare 
which the legislative body could have had in mind, 
which could have justified the regulation, it must 
be assumed by the court that the legislative body 
had those considerations in mind, and that thos,e · 
considerations did justify the regulations. When 
the necessity or propriety of an enactment was 
a question upon which reasonable minds might 
differ, the propriety and necessity or such ·enact-
ment was a matter of legislative determination. 
''We think it may be safely and sensibly said 
that justification for re.sidential zoning may, in 
the last analysis, be rested upon the protection 
of the civic an·d social values of the American 
home. The ·e'Stablishment of such districts is for 
the general welfare because it t·ends to promote 
and perpetuate the American home.'' 
·Oaire:s v. Building O·om.missioner of Hingham, 83 
N.E. 2d 550. 
''The planning hoard reported that there was 
no real demand for the amendment and that the 
matter could rest until a present need for it 
should app·ear, and further suggested that no 
zoning change be made until after the Common-
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wealth decided whether Route 128 was to be re-
located in the vicinity of ·the locus. The reason 
for the decision of the board evidence the care 
and consideration that were given to it; but while 
a report ought to be filed before action at the 
mee·ting, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, Section 27, as 
appearing in St. 1941, c. 320, so that the voters 
may learn of its recommendation.s, the report was 
only of an advisory nature and was not binding 
upon the voters. See Duffey ·v. is:chool Commitee 
of Hopkinton, 23'6 M-ass. 5, 127 N.E. 540; Sheldon 
v. School Committee of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230, 
235, 177 N.E. 94. 'The board and voters might well 
differ as to whether the time had arrived for a 
change in the zoning by-law. Indeed, it has been 
said that the necessity for legislation, like ques-
tions of· expediencey and the wisdom of an enact-
ment, lie outside the judicial realm. N ebbia v. 
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 538, 54 S. C·t. 505, 
78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469; United States v. 
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 
609, 132 A.L.R. 1430; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 
286, 61 S. Ct. 86·2, 85 L. Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.A. 
1500; Queenside Hills Realty Co., Inc., v. Saxl, 
328 u.~s:. 80, 82,_ 66 S. Ct. 850, 90 L. Ed. 1096. 
If it be thought that the necessity for an amend-
ment should appear in order to justify the spe-
cial .purposes for which an amendment may be 
had to a zoning by-law, it is enough to point out 
that a belief on the part of the voters, that addi-
tional use of the railroad premises would furnish 
better and cheaper transportation facilities for 
business firms that might locate there, even if 
some location other than the locus might possibly 
have been found, and that the location of a hay 
and grain bu.siness and a lumber yard outside the 
cent·er of the town would reduce the danger from 
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fire, could not be pronounced unreasonable or 
unwarranted. 
''The activity of Robinson in getting the 
amendment before the annual meeting, in advo-
cating its passage by newpaper advertisements 
and phamphlets, and in addressing the meeting, 
and somewhat less activity by McNulty, would not 
taint an enactment which was otherwise valid. 
It is common knowledge that nowhere is there 
a freer expression of individual views than at 
a town meeting on matters in which the town 
has an interest. ~Iuch may he said that may not 
be germane to the question before the meeting, 
but experience has taught that the good judgment 
and common sense of the voters can be · saf.ely 
relied upon to reach a correct decision. Publica-
tion of their opinions and debates by those hold-
ing various views only serve to assure such a de-
cision. There is nothing here to indicate that the 
majority of the voters were acting solely in be-
half of Robinson and McNulty rather in the best 
interests of the town as they thought, and there 
is nothing in the slightest degree that affects the 
integrity of their vote. 
''In any event, a classification as the means 
for attaining a permissible end is not to he de-
clared invalid ''if any state of facts reasonably 
can be conceived that would sustain it.'' Rast v. 
Van D·eman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357, 36 
S. Ct. 370, 37 4, ~60 L. Ed. 67'9, L.R.A. 1917 A. 
421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Carmichael v. South-
ern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 49·5, 509, 57 S. Ct. 
868, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327; New York 
Rapid Transit Corp· v. New York, 303 U.S. 573, 
. 578, 58 S. ·Ct. 721, 82 L. Ed. 1024. '' 
''It cannot be said that the judgment of those 
having an intimate knowledge of all the essential 
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public interest, is entirely lacking in any rational 
basis.. Due regard muE.:t be accorded to the col-
lective judgment of those familiar with the lo-
cality and the circumstances prevailing in the 
town. See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105, 
29 S. Ct. 567, 53 L .. Ed. 923. 
''The vote of the town meeting referring to 
''the whole or any part of'' the locus, which was 
immediately followed by a definite and specific 
description by metes and hounds of the entire 
area, '' so that thereafter said area ·.shall be used 
for business district uses as in said zoning law 
provided,'' must be reasonably construed, not 
''with technical strictness, but with the same liber-
ality as all votes and proceedings of municipal 
bodies or officers who are not presumed to be 
versed in the forms of law; and every reasonable 
presumption is to be made in its favor.'' Taunton 
v. Taylor, 116 Mass~ 254, 261. The only area men-
tioned in the vote is the entire area, and the pur-
port and effect of the vote, as expressly stated 
upon its face, were to change the by-law ".so 
that thereafter said area'' should be put in a busi-
ness zone. A vote in favor of the am·endment 
was a vote in favor of placing the entire area in 
a business distriet and cannot be p~roperly con-
strued as any thing else.'' 
Oorpora~ion of Presidi:ng B·ishop v. City of Porter-
ville, 203 P. 2d 82·3. 
''The burden is upon the plaintiff to allege 
and prove physical facts from which the court 
could conclude as a matter of law that the ordi-
nance was unreasonable and invalid. Wilkins v. 
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City of :san Bernardino, supra, 29 Cal. 2d 332, at 
page 338, 175 P. 2d 542. 
''In enacting zoning ordinances, the muni-
cipality performs a legislative function and every 
intendment is in favor of the validity of such 
ordinances. Jardine v. City of P·asadena, 199 Cal. 
64, 72-73, 248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R. ·509'. It is presumed 
that the enactment as· a whole is justified under 
the police power and adapted to promote the pub-
lic health; safety, morals, and general welfare. 
Lockare v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d ____ , 
202 P. 2d 38. 
''There is reasonable justification for the ac-
tion of the defendant city in prescribing the 
buildings which may be erected and constructed in 
the zone established for single family residences 
and in such cases the wisdom of the prohibitions 
and restrictions is a matter for legislative de-
termination. Lockhard v. ·City of Los Angele-a, 
supra, 33 Cal. 2d ____ , 202 p·. 2d 38. '' 
Lockhard v. City of Los Angeles, 202 P. 2d 38. 
' ' The courts will, of course, inquire as to whe-
the·r the scheme of classification and districting is 
arbitrary or unreasonable, but the decision of the 
zoning authorities as to matters of opinion and 
policy will not be set aside or disregarde·d by the 
courts unless the regulations have no reasonable 
relation to the public welfare or unless. the physical 
facts show that there has been an unreasonable, 
opp~ressive, or unwarranted interfe·rence with pro-
perty rights in the exercise of the police power. 
See Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 
2d 332, 338, 175 P. 2d 542, Acker v. Baldwin, 18 
Cal. 2d 341, 344, 115 P. 2d 455; Reynolda v. Barett, 
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12 .Cal. 2d 244, 251, 83 P. 2d 29; Jardine v. City 
of Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 72-76, 248 P. 225, 48 
A.L.R. 509; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 
Cal. 497, '514, 234 P. 388. The wisdom of the pro-
hibi!tions and restrictions is a matter for legis-
lative determination, and even though a court may 
not agree with that determination, it will not sub-
stitute its judgment for that of the zoning author-
ities if there is any reasonable justification for 
their action. Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of 
Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 93, 94, 33 P. 2d 672; Wil-
kins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332, 
338, 339, 175 P. 2d 542, see Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 
Cal. 2d 244, 83 P. 2d 29; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal. 
2d 341, 344, 115 P. 2d 455. In passing upon the 
validity of legislation it has been said that ''the 
rule is well settled that the legislative determina-
tion that the facts exist which make the law neces-
sary must not ·be set aside or disregarded by the 
courts, unless the legislative decision is clearly and 
palpably wrong ~nd the error appears beyond rea-
sonable doubt from facts or evidence which can-
not be controverted, and of which the courts may 
p·roperly take notice.'' In· re Miller, 162 Cal. 687, 
·696, 124 P. 427, 429; see also, Jardine v. City of 
Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 72, 248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R. 
509. 
''In considering the scope or nature of ap-
pellate review in a case of this type W·e must keep 
in mind the fact that the courts are examining the 
act of a coordinate branch of the government-the 
legislative-in a field in which it has paramount 
authority, and noit reviewing the decision of a lower 
tribunal or a fact-finding body. Courts have noth-
ing to do with the wisdom of laws or regulations, 
and the legislative power must he upheld unless 
manifestly abus·ed so as to infringe on constitu-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
51 
tional guaranties. The duty to uphold the legisla-
tive power is as much the duty of app·ellate courts · 
as it is of trial courts, and under the doctrine of 
separation of powers neither the trial nor ap:pel-
late courts are authorized to "review" legislat-
tive determinations. The only function of the 
courts is to ·determine whether the exercise of leg-
islative power has exceeded constitutional limi-
tations. 
''For the same reason the finding of the trial 
court that the area on J eff,erson zoned M-1 is simi-
lar and identical to the area zoned C-2 is not con-
trolling on the issue of the reasonableness of en-
acting the ordinance. It is well-·established that 
similar characteristics in adjacent and Burround-
ing areas do not necessarily preclude the zoning 
authorities from placing adjoining territories in 
different zones or justify a court in substituting 
its judgm·ent for the legislative decision. 
''Moreover, it appears that the majority of 
the M-1 uses were carried on by plaintiffs in de-
fiance of the zoning regulations, and they cannot 
take advantage of their own violations of the 
law." 
POINT VI 
FIXING A BOUNDARY FiOR A USE DISTRI!CT AT A 
CERTAIN NUMBER OF FEET FR.OM A GIVEN POINT 
D:OES NOT MAKE THE ORDINAN~CE INVALID. 
La~ngella v. City ,of Ba;ya'J'IIne, 46 A. 2d 789. (N.J.) 
Plaintiff operated a live poultry business at 116 West 
21st Street. He decided to move to 67 W. 21st Street 
and applied to the city for a transfer of his business. 
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He complied with the changes p·rescribed ·by the city 
health authorities. About this time the city adopted a 
zoning ordinance placing 67 West 21st Street in a dia-
trict where live poultry business was prohibited. He 
applied to the city council to transfer his license and 
pe'rmission to op·erate at this address. At that time no 
zoning hoard of adjustment had been appointed. The 
city council granted his request over protest of resi-
denta. After the hoard of adjustment was appointed he 
applied to it for a variance which was approved. The 
city ordinance provided that such business could not he 
conducted where a church, school, library, hospital, sani-
torium, or other public institution is located within 200 
~ 
feet of the boundary line of the proposed site. The:re 
was a .synagogue within 200 feet in a straight line. The 
court held: 
"We think the normal and ordinary mean-
ing of the words used in this ordinance; that the 
busineas is prohibited where a church is located 
within 200 feet of the boundary line of the pro-
posed site, is that the prohibited area measured 
200 feet from such boundary line that is nearest 
to the church in a straight line regardless of the 
course followed, rather than in some other man-
ner, such as by the usually traveled route or the 
street lines.'' 
Vine v. Board of Adjustment Village of R.idgewo~od, 
56 .A. 2d 122. Plaintiff ·aought review of action of the 
Board of Adjustment in denying her leave to construct 
a gasoline filling station on her property. The original 
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zoning ordinance pJaced this property in a business zone. 
In 1938 an amendment placed it in a "double dwelling" 
zone. In a previous action the court foun·d that the prop-
erty was not marketable· for either single or two family 
dwellings nor for business establishments and held the 
amendment an arbitrary interference. The city argues 
that placing the property in a diatrict zoned against 
gasoline stations is reasonable, and that to grant the 
permit would run counter to an ordinance which pro-
vided that ''no part of any filling station shall be within 
300 feet of any lot line of any plot on which is located 
any building used as a church, etc.'' The proposed struc-
ture would be 300 feet from the nearest p·art of the edi-
fice of the First Church of Christ Scientist, but sub-
stantially lesa than that distance from the closest bound-
ary line of the Church Curtilage, measured in a direct 
line. Plaintiff- claims that measurement from the line 
of the Curtilage renders the provision arbitrary and 
unre-asonable and therefore void, for if a given church 
structure covers but one end of a large plot, the restrict-
ed area would be much greater on the one side than on 
the other, and so the regulation would not apply to all 
properties uniformly and equally. The court says: 
"It is not arbitrary or unreasonable to pro-
vide for the measurement of the preacribed dis-
tance from the Curtilage rather than from the 
church edifice ; an·d the church structure covers 
the greater part of the tract. 
''In the absence of a clear expression contra, 
the restricted area is measurable by a straight 
line from one point to another.'' 
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Helimerle v. Village of Bronxville, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 
1002. On February 1, 1937, the plaintiffs Ben edicts 
leased a three story house with an option to buy, which 
house was. located in BusinesB "A" District. The south 
line of the lot was the north line of Residential "D" 
District. The north line of '' D'' District across the 
street was further north, about half the width of the lot 
in question. An apa·rtment house of forty-one apart ... 
ments was locate·d adjoining the boundary line on the 
side of the street opposite the lot in quetStion. The house 
was us.ed as a one-family residence from prior to 1901 
to 1916, when it was changed to a three-family resi-
dence. Later the bottom floor was used by a veterinary 
as an office and residence. When Benedicts becam·e in-
terested in the premises they indicated to the superin-
tendent of building their desire to use the first floor for 
a funeral home. They were informed that the building 
code did not permit conversion of the building from· 
residence to business as it was of frame construction 
and did not conform to the requirements of the code for 
buildings used for business. Not withstanding this defi-
nite warning of a possible violation of the building code, 
the Benedicts went ahead and leased the building and 
commenced to use the first floor for a fun·eral home, in 
the meantime filing these actions to restrain interference 
with such action by the defendants. For this change of 
use from residential purposes to the funeral home no 
certificate of occupancy was ever obtained or even ap-
plied for by Benedicts, although the code required such 
certificate. 
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In 1922 defendant village adopted a zoning o·rdi-
nance, substituting a new ordinance th·erefor in 1927. 
The property in question was alway.s in business ''A'' 
district. 
''Prior to 1931 this particular ·business dis-
trict extended further to the south on both sides 
of the stre-et. In 1931 the ordinance was amended 
to make the division line between the two districts 
where it now is, part of the busines.s district 
being thereby transferred to the residence dis-
trict. On December 7th, 1926, the Village ·also 
adopted a Building Code. This Code has never 
been amended since its adoption. The Zoning 
Ordinance, so far as it relates to the premises in 
question, has never been amended ·except that on · 
March 8th, 1937, the -amendment was adopted 
which now p·rovides : 'No building or premises 
shall be used, and no building shall he erected or 
altere·d which is arranged, intended or designed 
to be used ·as a mortuary, undertaking or embalm-
ing parlor, funeral chapel or similar plant or 
establishm·ent within two hundred (200) feet of 
any residence zone·.' '' 
The court then holds that the use of the house as a 
funeral home· prior to the passage of the am·endmen't of 
the zoning ordinance on March 8, 193-7, was. in violation 
of the Building Code and so did not establish a lawful 
use prior to the passage of the zoning amendment. Th·e 
court then says : 
"From the foregoing it is obvious that th·e 
amendment of March 8th, 1937, applies in its 
terms to this particular p·roperty. This brings 
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us to the next question. The plaintiffs claim that 
such amendment is unrea8onable and void for two 
·reasons: First, because such amendment, upon 
· its face, is so arbitrary and unreasonable, and 
lacks such relation to p·ublic welfare, ·etc.; that it 
is void as a matter of law. :s:econd, if the amend-
ment be held to be valid upon its face and within 
the authority of the municip;ality to adopt, then 
it is unreasonable and void as applied to the 
premises of the plaintiffs. These questions will 
be considered in the order indicated.'' 
The court then discusses the authorities on the ques-
tion of the right to limit undertaking establishments in 
a zoning ordinance and concludes that the right exists. 
The ·court then says : 
"The ·determination of the first objection 
made to this amendment by the plaintiffs must 
be made upon the ordinance itself. Town of Islip 
v. F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., 257 N.Y. 
167, 177 N. E. 409. The test is, can it be said that 
the ordinance in this respect on its face passes 
the bounds of reason and assumes the character 
of a merely arbitrary ~at~ Village of Euclid, 
Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, at page 
389, 47 S. Ct. -114, 118, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 
1016; Town of Islip v. F. E. Summers Coal & 
Lumber ·Co., supra. If the validity of the legis-
lative ·classification for zoning purposes be fairly 
debatable, the legislative judgment must be al-
lowed to control. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Amb-
ler Realty Co., sup-ra, p~age 388, 47 S. Ct. page 
118; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, at page 
29~6, 150 N. E. 120, 43 A.L.R. 651; Town of Islip 
v. F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., supra, at 
page 169, 177 N. E. 409. So considered the court 
' 
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has reached the conclusion that it cannot he said 
upon mere inspection of the Zoning Ordinance 
that the end in view is not reasonably p~ursued by 
its adoption in order to promote the general wel-
fare under the police power. Town of Islip v. 
F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., supra. In 
effect, the village has defined a residence district 
for the exclusion therefrom of general business 
and then provided for its extension for an addi-
tional 200 feet with respect to the particular 
business of undertaking establishments. This is· 
not a violation of the provisions of section 176 
of the Village Law that· all such regulations shall 
be uniform for each class or kind of buildings 
throughout each district. By that section the 
regulations in one district may differ from those 
in another district. The regulations are uni-
form with respect to undertaking establishments 
throughout the district thus extended. Such an 
ordinance, as indicated by the authorities cited, 
may be sustained under the general welfare 
power, without p·articular regard to zoning ordi-
nances, where the residential area is definitely 
defined ·and the limitation reasonable. It cannot 
be said here that 200 feet is unreasonable as a 
matter of law so as to invalidate the .entire amend-
ment. 
"Upon the second contention that the ordi-· 
nance is in fact unreasonable and void as applied 
to this particular property, the plaintiffs have the· 
burden nf proof. The evidence shows that the 
property immediately adjoins a residence district. 
The building is within a few feet of another 
building used for residence purpos·es. Many 
other residences· exist within the neighborhood 
on both sides of the street in the residence dis-
trict. Opposite is an apartment house with forty-
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one families. The owners may be able to derive 
more money on a sale for this particular business 
purpose than _for some other purpose, but the 
property is still available for use as a residence 
and the pecuniary reason alone is not sufficient 
to invalidate the ordinance. The fact is that if it 
is properly converted in accordance with the 
Building Code, the building may be used for many 
kinds of business with equal facility. The fact 
that other property within the 200 foot distance 
in other locations may be unreasonably affected, 
if such fact exists, does not aid the plaintiffs. 
Brown v. City of Los Angeles, supra. The only 
question which the plaintiffs are entitled to argue 
is that the restriction is unreasonable as applied 
to this property. Wulfsohn v. Burden, supra. 
'The burden of proof on that subject has not been 
sustained by the plaintiffs. The undisputed facts 
definitely show the contrary. '' 
We wish to here point out that Section 176 of the 
Village Law referred to in the foregoing case is iden-
tical to Section 15-8-90, heretofore quoted under Point 
IV. 
White v. Lwquire Fwnenal H:ome, 221 Ala. 440, 
129 'Slo. 84. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant 
from erecting and 1op~erating a funeral home in the 
plaintiffs' imm·ediate neighbo-rhood. The site of the 
funeral home was in a commercial zone. The zoning 
ordinance permitte:d erection and ·use of buildings in 
commercial zone for ~any purpose except sp-ecified uses, 
specifying that ''undertaking, embalming, or cremating 
parlor if so located that any part is within 300 feet of 
any lot which is a residence district and which abuts 
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upon any part of any stree't which adjoins the lot upon 
which such structure is situated.'' Defendant's p·arlor 
was permitted under this ordinance. The court says : 
''We cannot say that the zoning of the site 
of this funeral home within a commercial district, 
with authority to conduct such business at points· 
within such district, was arbitrary· or unreason-
able upon consideration of all the factors of the 
problem. Indeed, we cannot say we know all the 
considerations that may have properly influenced 
the zoning of this property. 
''We are not unmindful that the sam.e dis-
comfort comes to residents thus brought into 
near contact with a funeral home as if no zoning 
ordinance ·existed. Complain·ants are entitled to 
the protection accorded to all others in the en-
joyment of the family residence under like con-
ditions. What we do hold is that all of us must 
bear ·such discomforts as com·e from changing 
conditions of city life, among them :the lawful zon-
ing of our properties with a view to the general 
welfare.'' 
The case of In Re J er~Jn,ings' Est'at.e, 198 A. 621. 
The trustees of the estate of Jennings, deceased, applied 
to the Board of Adjustment for leave to p·ermit occu-
pancy of a certain 2¥2 story residence, containing nine-
teen rooms and four baths, as a fraternity house. The 
prop·erty had been vacant since 1921 and they were un-
able either to sell it or rent it for one-family occupancy 
or for any purpose not prohibited by Section 9-A of the 
zoning 'Ordinance. During its vacancy large sums of 
money had been spent on its upkeep·. The application 
was made in 1937 and was deniQd by the Board after 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
60 
a_ hearing. The Board-. decided it could not grant the 
application as it would involve amending the ordinance 
and this was solely within the jurisdiction of the City 
Council. The prop~erty was changed in 1926 from B 
Residence to C Residence. In the latter district only 
one-family dwellings were permitted. Se·ction 3 of the 
ordinance defines multiple dwellings as one ''designed 
for or occupied otherwise than as a one-family dwelling, 
two-family dwelling, or double house'' and include·s fra-
ternity houses in the multiple dwelling class_ .. The result 
of the denial of the ·application amounted to virtual con-
fiscation under the restricted uses of the zoning ordi-
nance. The court says: 
"As it appeared that the proposed use was 
a multiple dwelling within the definition of the 
ordinance, and that it was a use prohibited by 
Sec. 9-A, the actfon of the board was strictly in 
accord with the ordinance. 
''Appellants, while apparently not denying 
that their proposed use is prohibited, ~contend 
that strict enforcement will result in unconsti-
tutional deprivation of the use of their property 
for the reasons quoted above (could not be sold 
or rented for any purpose, amounting to confisca-
tion) ; that the decision appealed from is 'a mani-
fest and flagrant abuse of discretion,' an'd that 
this court should now so -declare. 
''The court is not empowered to say that the 
general welfare of the other property owners 
whose use is limited to one-family residences is 
secured and the sp·irit of this ordinance .is ob-
served and substantial justice done by excepting 
/ . from the operation of the ordinance the particular 
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dwelling owned by the appellants. Flats ·or small 
apartment houses may be entirely exclude-d from 
residential districts.'' 
We respectfully submit that the plaintiffs did not 
have -such an interest as entitles them, or either of them, 
to attac:k the ordinance in question upon the grounds 
asaerted in this cause. We further submit that there 
is no evidence in the record to overcome the presumption 
that the ordinance is valid. The plaintiffs must rely 
solely upon a mere insp-ection of the ordinance as the 
basis of asserting it is invalid as there is no evidence 
to assiat them. Under such conditions the court could 
not say as ·a matter of law that the ordinance is invalid. 
It is not the provin·ce of the courts to invade th.e broad 
discretionary powers vested in the_ City Commission to 
determine its legislative policy in zoning the City. 
We respectfully su~mit that the judgm,ent of the 
trial court should be sustained. 
- Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRISTENSEN, 
City Attorney 
HOMER HOLMGREN, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
.A.s.sistamt Cit.y A:t1torneys, 
Attorneys fo'f Defendants 
·and Resrpondents. 
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